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THE CONSISTENCY OF CONSERVATIVE TAX
POLICY
Marjorie E. Kornhauser
ABSTRACT—Conservative tax arguments have been remarkably consistent
in substance, style, and method for almost a century. Substantively, their
tax policy consists of three claims: (1) an economic one that low taxes
encourage economic growth and prosperity for all, (2) a legal–
constitutional one that excessive federal spending and heavy taxes
unbalance our federal form of government at best, and at worst
unconstitutionally violate state rights, and (3) a patriotic claim that high
tax-and-spend policies are un-American. This third, patriotic, claim is a
major factor in conservatives’ remarkable success in selling their policy to
the public and in the current political stalemate about taxation. The
emotional aspect of patriotism inhibits rational discussion and limits the
range of politically feasible solutions. This Article suggests that if
conservatives would focus on their two substantive points, they would help
create an atmosphere more conducive to the thoughtful tax discussion the
country requires.
The Article illustrates conservatives’ consistency with an examination
of the linked battles concerning income tax reduction and a veterans’ bonus
that occurred between 1924 and 1936. This period had much in common
with the present, including (1) the growth of government, (2) increased
knowledge about human behavior, (3) the development of new mass media,
(4) the use of the new media by organizations to disseminate their
viewpoints to the public, (5) increased lobbying (at least partially due to the
other factors), and (6) mounting concern that the lobbying was distorting
the political process. Commentators, then and now, have noted that some
organizations purporting to be broad-based civic groups providing neutral
information are really vehicles through which small—sometimes
wealthy—groups try to shape public opinion and thereby pressure Congress
to adopt their self-interested viewpoint. This Article focuses on two
groups—the National Economy League, a group active in the 1930s, and,
to a lesser degree, the Citizens’ National Committee in the 1920s.
AUTHOR—John E. Koerner Professor of Law, Tulane University School of
Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Although liberals and conservatives in the United States generally
disagree about tax issues, they tend to be unanimous in their belief that
federal taxation today is in an alarming state of disarray. Moreover, few (if
any) see a quick or easy path out of the morass that now passes for tax
policy. While both liberals and conservatives share the blame for the
current situation, conservatives bear the heavier responsibility for the
political stalemate because they have been more successful at articulating
and selling their tax policy to the public. Their policy rests on three claims,
which they have been asserting and disseminating with remarkable
consistency for decades.
The first claim is an economic one. Low taxes—especially for the
wealthy—encourage investment, which leads to economic growth and
prosperity for all.1 High taxes, in contrast, hamper economic growth by
facilitating excessive and wasteful government spending. Although some
people disagree with this conclusion about the results of high taxes, the
claim does make an important connection between taxing and spending—a
link that liberals often ignore.
The second claim is a legal and even a constitutional one. Excessive
federal spending—fueled by heavy taxation—unbalances America’s
federalist form of government by creating too strong a central government.2
Indeed, such spending, they argue, is often unconstitutional because it
exceeds the limited powers granted to the federal government and infringes
upon states’ rights.
The legal–constitutional argument blends into conservatives’ third
claim, which, simply put, asserts that high tax-and-spend policies are
1

For a discussion of this claim, see THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729,
TAXES AND THE ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945 (2012); Eric
Kroh, CRS Faces Allegations of Bias, 137 TAX NOTES 714 (2012); Rudy Takala & Salim Furth,
Scholars Agree: High Tax Rates Do Harm Growth, FOUNDRY (Jan. 27, 2013, 9:27 AM),
http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/27/scholars-agree-high-tax-rates-do-harm-growth/; William McBride,
What Is the Evidence on Taxes and Growth?, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2012), http://taxfoundation.org/
article/what-evidence-taxes-and-growth.
2
For a modern statement of this belief, see REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, WE BELIEVE IN
AMERICA: 2012 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 10–11, 21–22 (2012), http://www.gop.com/wp-content/
uploads/2012/08/2012GOPPlatform.pdf, which discusses “Federalism and The Tenth Amendment” and
“Reforming Government to Serve the People.”
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un-American. This patriotic tax appeal bears the heaviest responsibility for
the tax morass for several reasons. First, American history and myth create
a natural sympathy in many Americans for small federal government and
low taxation. Second, patriotism’s emotional appeal gains traction more
easily with the public than rationally based appeals to theoretical ideas of
distributive justice. Its effectiveness increases even more because
conservatives have employed sophisticated emotional appeals to
disseminate their tax position to the public. For decades they have used the
most modern techniques of persuasion and the most modern mass media to
sway public opinion. Conservatives’ successful marriage of patriotism’s
emotionality to the “objectivity” of low taxation, however, raises a barrier
to rational discussions about tax policy and limits the range of politically
feasible solutions. Consequently, this argument bears the heaviest
responsibility for the current tax morass.
The recent fight about the Affordable Care Act3 illustrates the obstacle
that conservatives’ patriotic tax approach presents to rational debates. For
example, many opponents assailed the Act as un-American—even
socialistic—government spending and taxation, but at the same time
opposed cuts in other government-run programs such as Medicare or Social
Security.4 Similarly, some people express outrage at the long delays
veterans now face in obtaining promised benefits, and many note the role
bureaucratic errors play in those delays; fewer note how increased
funding—paid with tax dollars—could speed the transition to electronic
databases, decrease errors, and facilitate faster benefits.5
Veterans’ benefits and their relation to taxation was also a huge issue
in the 1920s and 1930s6—a time in which conservatives used the same
3

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See, e.g., Cruz Presses Ahead with Defunding ObamaCare, Says It Will Take a ‘Tsunami’ of
Support, FOX NEWS (Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/08/25/cruz-press-aheadwith-defunding-obamacare-but-says-it-will-take-national/; Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol & John
Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 25, 26 (2011).
Former South Carolina Senator and Heritage Foundation president Jim DeMint said that week:
“I cannot think of anything that’s more un-American than national government-run health care . . . .
Those who believe in those principles of socialism and collectivism we’ve seen over the centuries, they
see as their holy grail taking control of the health care system.” Igor Volsky, Jim DeMint: Providing
Health Care for Seniors and Veterans is ‘Un-American’ and Grounded in ‘Socialism,’ THINKPROGRESS
(Aug. 30, 2013, 8:55 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/08/30/2555561/jim-demint-programslike-medicare-veterans-health-care-american-grounded-socialism/. See also Jackie Calmes, Delicate
Pivot as G.O.P. Blasts Rivals on Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at A9 (discussing Republican
criticisms of Medicare cuts).
5
E.g., Aaron Glantz, Number of Veterans Who Die Waiting for Benefits Claims Skyrockets, DAILY
BEAST (Dec. 20, 2012, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/12/20/number-of-vet
erans-who-die-waiting-for-benefits-claims-skyrockets.html; Randi Kaye & Scott Bronstein, Hundreds
of Thousands of War Vets Still Waiting for Health Benefits, CNN (Oct. 29, 2012, 10:04 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/29/health/delayed-veterans-benefits.
6
See discussion infra Parts I & II.
4
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arguments they use today about taxing and spending. Immediately after
World War I, pressure began building to both cut income taxes and to pay
veterans “adjusted” compensation (popularly, the “soldiers’ bonus”)—a
practice dating to the Revolutionary War. Both party platforms for the 1920
presidential election called for tax reform and supported aiding disabled
veterans.7 Neither, however, mentioned a bonus for the able-bodied, which
was a politically contested issue. Although many Democrats, such as
former presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan, argued that a war
profits tax could fund a general bonus, the Democratic platform stated that
veterans’ patriotism and “heroic conduct . . . constitute a sacred heritage of
posterity, the worth of which can never be recompensed from the Treasury
and the glory of which must not be diminished by any such expedients.”8
Although the Republican platform was also silent on the issue, presidential
candidate Warren Harding hinted he might favor a general bonus.9 As
president, however, he vigorously opposed it, stating that tax reduction was
the top priority, and a bonus would prevent that.10 In 1921, he and Secretary
of the Treasury Andrew Mellon succeeded in getting Congress to table the
bonus bill and enact tax reductions—although not large enough to satisfy
him or Mellon.11 In March 1922, Harding vetoed a bonus bill on both
financial and patriotic grounds, stating that tax reduction would make
America “a better country for which to fight, or to have fought, and affords
a surer abiding place in which to live and attain.”12
Although the American Legion promptly announced it would continue
fighting for a general soldiers’ compensation, other veterans organized to
oppose a bonus for able-bodied veterans.13 Groups such as the Ex-Service
Men’s Anti-Bonus League contended that a general bonus would be an
“unjust burden of taxation.”14 Moreover, the League stressed the unAmerican nature of such a bonus. Others, including the 1920 Democratic
platform, had opposed a bonus on the grounds that it might “diminish[]”

7

See PAUL DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN AMERICAN EPIC 25 (2006). See
also the party platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1920, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 8, 1820),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29635; Democratic Party Platform of 1920, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 28, 1920), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29592
[hereinafter Democratic Party Platform]. For a contemporary history of the bonus in 1924, see, for
example, 65 CONG. REC. 10761–63 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Rep. Fish (R-NY)).
8
Democratic Party Platform, supra note 7.
9
DICKSON & ALLEN, supra note 7, at 25–26.
10
Id. at 26.
11
See id.
12
Id. at 26–27; “Bad Finance, Not Patriotic”; Bonus Vetoed, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 20, 1922,
at 1. For a recent discussion of the bonus and taxation, see Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes,
and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924 Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon
Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373 (2006).
13
See Legion Deadlocked on Bonus Question, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1923, at 3.
14
Veterans Organize Anti-Bonus League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1922, at 9.
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the “glory” of the veterans’ sacrifice.15 The League, however, went much
further: the “material reward” of a bonus was “repugnant to the spirit of
true patriotism and a violation of the fundamental principles of American
citizenship.”16
After Harding’s death in August 1923, President Calvin Coolidge
continued to press for tax reductions instead of a bonus.17 Nevertheless, in
June 1924, Congress passed both; the latter over Coolidge’s veto.18 Neither
side was satisfied. Those who wanted the tax reduction believed the rates
needed to decline further. Bonus supporters demanded immediate payment
rather than the deferred ones promised under the 1924 Act. The linkage
between a soldier’s bonus and taxation continued until 1936 when the
bonus issue was finally resolved.
Although the issues crossed party lines, mainstream Republicans
tended to oppose the bonus more frequently than Democrats. For example,
progressive-leaning Republicans, such as Representative James Frear
(R-WI) and presidential hopeful Senator Hiram Johnson (R-CA), favored it
in the 1920s.19 Some Democrats opposed it, including President Roosevelt,
who after a prolonged silence on the issue vetoed a bonus compensation act
in the 1930s.20 Although both parties favored income tax reduction in the
1920s, big differences between the parties existed—ones that are familiar
to Americans today: how much of a reduction and which class of taxpayers
would get the bigger cuts. In general, Republicans (other than the
progressive or “radical” ones) favored the Mellon Plan, which dramatically
slashed rates on the wealthiest taxpayers. Democrats, on the other hand,
generally favored reducing taxes more for lower income taxpayers than
wealthy ones.21 (Even “low” income taxpayers, it must be noted, were
relatively well off because fewer than 10% of Americans paid income
tax.)22
Generalizing again, those favoring the Mellon Plan in the 1920s were
against the bonus. For conservatives, the two issues were two sides of the
same coin: the bonus would cost so much that tax reduction would not be
possible for years. In the 1930s, conservative groups such as the National
Economy League not only opposed the bonus but also other New Deal

15

Democratic Party Platform, supra note 7.
Legion Deadlocked on Bonus Question, supra note 13.
17
See infra Part I.
18
See infra notes 107–09.
19
See, e.g., Parke Brown, “Mirage,” Hiram Cries at Mellon Tax Cut Plans, CHI. DAILY TRIB.,
Jan. 19, 1924, at 5.
20
H.R. DOC. NO. 74-197, at 1 (1935).
21
See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2585 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Blanton); 65 CONG. REC. 2587
(Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Garner).
22
See, e.g., MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION,
1933–1939, at 4, 70 (1984).
16
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taxing and spending programs.23 Pro-bonus Democrats and progressive
Republicans, on the other hand, tended to ignore the bonus’s cost, think the
cost was overblown, or believe new taxes could pay for it. In 1924, for
example, Representative Frear (R-WI) claimed there could be both a bonus
and a tax cut for every taxpayer if state and local securities were taxed, a
“moderate” excess-profits tax and an undistributed profits tax existed,
inheritance tax were increased, and a gift tax were enacted. Also, he
believed publicizing tax records would increase tax collections.24
The long anti-bonus/pro-tax reduction battle illustrates the consistency
of conservative tax policy and the marketing of that policy. This Article’s
focus on two intense portions of that campaign illuminates the policy’s
strength (the connection between taxing and spending) and its weakness
(nonrational appeals to patriotism). It begins with the 1923–1924
presidential campaign and proceeds to describe the National Economy
League campaign in the 1930s. Within these two campaigns, the Article
concentrates on the key emotion-based patriotic aspect of the conservative
position. Due to space limitations, it does not explore the rich theoretical
and empirical evidence that explains how cognitive biases and emotionbased, often unconscious, concepts—such as framing, schema, and
worldviews—bypass and/or influence rational thought. Rather, it
concentrates on describing the methods conservatives used to link
patriotism to their tax policy. One hundred years of such linkage, layered
on top of a mythic strain of anti-tax sentiment dating back to the foundation
of the nation, have contributed to today’s heated but deeply unproductive
tax debates.
I. 1923–1924 TAX REDUCTION/ANTI-BONUS CAMPAIGN
In November 1923, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon opened
his campaign to further reduce taxes beyond what had been achieved in the
Revenue Act of 1921 with a letter to House Ways and Means Chairman
William R. Green (R-IA).25 In the letter, sent while Congress was recessed,
Mellon explicitly linked tax reduction and the bonus. The bonus, he said,
would postpone tax reduction for many years.26 Moreover, “[i]t would
mean an increase rather than a decrease in taxes, for in the long run it could
be paid only out of moneys collected.”27 Congress had to choose between
tax reductions and a soldiers’ bonus; there could not be both.
The twinned pro-tax reduction/anti-bonus campaigns appeared
everywhere, in all types of media: in-the-flesh speeches, radio talks,
23
24
25
26
27
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See infra Part II.
65 CONG. REC. 647–48 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear).
H.R. DOC. NO. 68-63, at 11 (1924).
Id.
Id.
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newspaper and magazine articles, and even “flash” promotions on movie
screens. From the beginning, these campaigns urged adoption of the
Mellon Plan without any changes, as if, opponents charged, it were the only
way tax reform could occur. Mellon Plan supporters also promoted a letterwriting campaign, urging the public to write or telegram their congressmen,
demanding they support the Plan and oppose the bonus.28
Mellon and his supporters alleged that their tax reduction plan was
“scientific” and economically efficient, in contrast to the plans offered by
Representatives Frear and Garner. Mellon Plan opponents, however,
countered that Mellon’s plan was no more scientific than any other plan.
They supplied several pieces of evidence of the political nature of Mellon’s
plan. One was the timing of the letter. Sent while Congress was recessed,
Congress would not even get a copy of the bill until almost a month later.
Representative Frear alleged that the political nature was self-evident
because Mellon himself would greatly benefit from his plan.29 Others, such
as Senator Royal Copeland (D-NY), said the linkage of tax reduction to a
denial of a veterans’ bonus revealed the political motivation of the plan and
“did much finally to discredit the claim for the Mellon plan that it was a
‘scientific’ bill, for the two proposals are essentially independent, although,
of course, the passage of any law contemplating additional expenditures
increases the cost of government.”30 In other words, although conservatives
clearly connected taxing and spending—something liberals often failed to
do—then as now, they were making that connection only for certain
spending programs.
The pro-reduction/anti-bonus campaign occurred on multiple levels.
Mellon, for example, not only provided Congress with information, but
also promoted his plan, even publishing a book aimed at the general public,
Taxation: The People’s Business.31 The Treasury also promoted the Plan in
testimony and articles.32 Additionally, Under Secretary of the Treasury
Garrard Winston secretly collaborated with J.A. Arnold—a lobbyist with a
shady reputation—who operated through allegedly nonpartisan interest
groups he managed: the American Taxpayers’ League (formerly the
American Bankers League) and the National Council of State
Legislatures.33
28

See infra note 57.
65 CONG. REC. 2509 (Feb. 15, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear).
30
65 CONG. REC. 10626 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Sen. Copeland).
31
ANDREW W. MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS (1924). See also Andrew William
Mellon, The Business of Taxation, 2 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 105 (1924).
32
See, e.g., Hon. Garrard B. Winston, Principles Involved in Income Tax Reduction, 2 NAT’L
INCOME TAX MAG. 69 (1924).
33
ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS TO UNTAX
THE ONE PERCENT 45–53, 59–61 (2013); M. Susan Murnane, Selling Scientific Taxation: The Treasury
Department’s Campaign for Tax Reform in the 1920s, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 819, 843–44, 851
(2004).
29
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James Couzens, the progressive Republican Senator from Michigan,
among others, asserted that Mellon and the Treasury did not just provide
information, but spread propaganda: “More dishonest statements,
misstatements if not absolute falsehoods, have been handed out at the
Treasury Department of the United States for the purpose of misleading the
public than ever were issued by a public department in my recollection of
government.”34 Representative John Jones (D-TX) called Mellon “a
magician in figures as well as in finance” who conveniently misstated
figures.35 Senator Thaddeus Caraway (D-AR) went so far as to allege that
Mellon was linked to the anti-bonus propaganda through contributions to
the Anti-Bonus League by officials of companies that Mellon had interests
in—a link Mellon denied.36
Even President Coolidge linked tax reduction to the bonus. In a
Lincoln Day Speech, his first post-election, nonofficial speech aimed at the
entire country, Coolidge asserted that the Mellon Plan coupled with a
rejection of the soldiers’ bonus would keep the nation prosperous.37
Furthermore, he stated that although providing compensation to injured
soldiers was appropriate, paying it to healthy veterans was morally
reprehensible since they had not served for monetary gain.38 Coolidge
insisted, “[T]he people must understand this is their fight. They alone can
win it. Unless they made their wishes known to the Congress without
regard to party this bill will not pass. I urge them to renewed efforts [to
write Congress].”39 An estimated five million people listened to Coolidge’s
speech on a radio network so new that the papers found it newsworthy
enough to note, “[A]tmospheric conditions were splendid for
broadcasting . . . .”40
Business interests, which sponsored most of the pro-Mellon/anti-bonus
literature, began campaigning immediately after Mellon’s letter, and
without even seeing his Plan.41 The campaigns flooded the press—
especially in big city papers and popular journals like the Literary Digest
and the Saturday Evening Post.42 The United States Chambers of
34

65 CONG. REC. 1203 (Jan. 21, 1924) (statement of Sen. Couzens); see 65 CONG. REC. 3332
(Feb. 29, 1924) (statement of Rep. Crosser (D-OH)).
35
65 CONG. REC. 643–44 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jones).
36
65 CONG. REC. 3684–86 (Mar. 6, 1924); Mellon Vigorously Denies He Assisted Anti-Bonus
League, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 6, 1924, at 11. See infra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
37
See Will Permit No Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1924, at 1.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
5,000,000 Hear Speech of Coolidge by Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1924, at 2.
41
E.g., 65 CONG. REC. 2590 (Feb. 16, 1924) (Rep. Tague (D-Mass.)); Mellon Program Boon to
Industry, Financiers Assert, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1923, at 1.
42
See 65 CONG. REC. 10762–63 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Rep. Fish); 65 CONG. REC. 744
(Jan. 9, 1924) (statement of Sen. Ashurst) (referencing the Saturday Evening Post); 65 CONG. REC. 644
(Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jones (D-TX)) (referencing the New York Herald, the New York
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Commerce had long been advocating against a bonus, in large measure
because it would necessitate increased taxation.43 Mellon’s letter spurred
many chambers of commerce and trade organizations to launch new,
ambitious campaigns promoting the Mellon Plan.44
Like Mellon, Coolidge, and others, the campaigns by these
organizations made economic and moral arguments. Paying a bonus to
healthy veterans, they claimed, would not only be so costly as to prevent
tax reduction and hinder economic prosperity, but also insult the “selfrespect and memory of the American soldiers who served not for money
but for love of their country.”45
Ostensibly nonbusiness groups, such as the Ex-Service Men’s AntiBonus League, also reinvigorated their anti-bonus campaigns. The League
was organized in September 1922 by several prominent veterans such as
Elihu Root Jr., a founding partner in what became the Dewey Ballantine
law firm,46 “to combat, as a matter of principle, all propaganda and
attempted legislation to bonus or pension”47 service men who were not
injured at war.48 Following Mellon’s letter, however, the League rapidly
expanded its membership and its activities.49 While favoring all necessary
support for disabled veterans, it opposed a general bonus for able-bodied
ones on the now-familiar dual economic and moral grounds.50 Such a bonus
would increase taxation and demean soldiers’ sacrifices for their country.51
It would “obliterate” their “splendid” service, reducing it “to the level of
the service rendered by the man who digs a ditch for a wage.”52
There were, of course, some Democrats (typically more conservative
ones) who also objected to a general bonus on patriotic grounds. Senator
William Bruce (D-MD) for example, warned that pro-bonus soldiers ran
the risk of turning their patriotism into selfish class behavior.53 Generally,
World, and the New York Times); 65 CONG. REC. 645, 649 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear)
(referencing Philadelphia papers and “[m]etropolitan papers”); see also Murnane, supra note 33, at 836
(Post had at least one pro-Mellon article a month in 1924).
43
E.g., Calls for Support in Fighting Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1922, at 3; Commerce Chamber
Opposes Cash Bonus, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1921, at 1.
44
E.g., Plans Nation-Wide Fight for Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1923, at 2 (New York
Chamber of Commerce); Starts National Drive for Mellon Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1923, at 4
(Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce).
45
Birmingham for Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1923, at 4. See Barnes Assails Bonus in Cash to
Veterans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1923, at 8; Starts National Drive for Mellon Tax Plan, supra note 44.
46
Elihu Root Jr., Lawyer, Is Dead; Statesman’s Son a Civic Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1967,
at 31.
47
Veterans Organize Anti-Bonus League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1922, at 9.
48
Id.; Ex-service Men Fight Bonus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1922, at 9.
49
Reports Activities in Anti-bonus Move, BALT. SUN, Jan. 2, 1924, at 5.
50
Veterans Organize Anti-Bonus League, supra note 47.
51
Id.
52
Reports Activities in Anti-bonus Move, supra note 49.
53
See 65 CONG. REC. 2741–44 (Feb. 19, 1924) (statement of Sen. Bruce).
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however, it was conservative Republicans and businessmen who raised the
anti-patriotic claim. Sometimes, the charges were more serious. A letter to
the Editor from the president of the Anti-Bonus League said bonus
supporters were not really in favor of the bonus, but engaged in an “anticapitalistic crusade.”54
Complaints against pro-Mellon reduction/anti-bonus supporters began
as quickly as their campaign. Some critics even called it the largest
propaganda campaign in the country’s history.55 Even some Republicans
criticized it. Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY) noted that the campaign
was built on the slogan “Bonus or tax reduction—which?”56 As a result of
businesses spending millions of dollars, congressmen received thousands of
letters, telegrams, and petitions demanding that congressmen support the
Mellon Plan and reject the bonus bill. On January 7, Representative James
Frear (R-WI) declared Congress was “deluged” by letters from business
interests supporting a Mellon bill that none of the writers had seen; the
Ways and Means Committee, he said, was getting at least 300 letters daily
“written at the instigation of leagues, boards, and clubs” who, in turn, were
probably prompted by NYC-area bankers.57 Moreover, he stated, every
congressman who refused to support the Mellon Bill—a bill that would
preclude a bonus bill—had been threatened with opposition at the next
election.58
Some banks and corporations took out pro-reduction/anti-bonus ads in
the newspapers; some urged readers, customers, and employees to send
pro-reduction/anti-bonus letters. A large musical instrument company in
New York City won the “blue ribbon” for “brazen effrontery,” according to
Representative Lamar Jeffers (D-AL).59 The company sent a memo to
employees requesting that they write their senators and representatives
because it was “of the utmost importance and a matter of vital interest to all
of us” to pass the Mellon plan and reject the bonus bill.60 It instructed
employees to give their letters to the company’s executive office, which
would forward them to the Evening Mail.61 The newspaper would fill in the
names of their congressional delegates. The company ended its memo
saying: “We shall check up [sic] our pay roll within the next couple of
weeks to find out those who have written and those who have not.”62
54

Letter to the Editor, Red Fringe of the Bonus Agitation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1924, at 14.
See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 742 (Jan. 9, 1924) (statement of Sen. Simmons); 65 CONG. REC. 939
(Jan. 14, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harrison).
56
65 CONG. REC. 10763 (June 5, 1924) (statement of Rep. Fish).
57
65 CONG. REC. 645 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statement of Rep. Frear).
58
See id.
59
65 CONG. REC. 2611 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jeffers).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.; 65 CONG. REC. 1185 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jeffers). See also 65 CONG. REC.
644–46 (Jan. 7, 1924) (statements of Reps. Jones and Frear); 65 CONG. REC. 744 (Jan. 9, 1924)
55
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On January 5 Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) read into the
Congressional Record one of the many pro-reduction/anti-bonus letters he
and other congressmen had received. He noted that the letter, written by
Pierre S. du Pont, head of E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company and General
Motors Corporation, shed a “very interesting” light on the views of the rich
about both the bonus and taxation.63 Like other statements on the issue, du
Pont’s letter mixed economic and moral issues. After stating that high taxes
discourage productive investment and encourage wasteful spending, du
Pont then turned to the bonus, a topic “linked closely” to taxes.64 Although
he supported those who had “just claim[s]”—that is, those injured in the
war—he opposed using the “national income” to pay additional
compensation to the uninjured.65 These able-bodied veterans did not need
special attention because:
By fortune these men are the most favored of our citizens. They have youth,
health, strength, opportunity, and, having served in one war, are practically
secure against further call. Since the war these men have all had opportunity
to find employment at almost the highest wage ever known, in purchasing
power perhaps the highest.66

Moreover, he continued, their “lot” was far superior to that of orphans,
women who lost jobs to returning men, the elderly poor, and “women who,
having served the Nation in the highest degree through their motherhood,
are left with their children unsupported through the death of their
breadwinner.”67 Finally, du Pont wrote, even if it were true that the bonus
was merely to show gratitude, “[it] would . . . be pitifully insincere to
tender to these defenders of the Nation a purse, not made up by the whole
Nation but voted by a majority out of the pockets of a defenseless
minority.”68 (Presumably, he meant the rich, who were the small minority
that actually paid income taxes.)
Senator McKellar replied scathingly to du Pont. Du Pont, he charged,
displayed “unequaled selfishness” because he
profited probably as much as any one man in the United States by the war, and
having secured your profits are now so ungenerous as to begrudge the
payment of a just tax for the purpose of paying war debts, including a
readjustment of pay so honestly due to the splendid soldiers that preserved

(statement of Sen. Ashurst); 65 CONG. REC. 1185 (Jan. 21, 1924) (statement of Sen. Copeland);
65 CONG. REC. 4373 (Mar. 17, 1924) (statement of Rep. Jeffers).
63
65 CONG. REC. 1382 (Jan. 24, 1924) (statement of Sen. McKellar).
64
Id. at 1383.
65
Id. at 1382–83.
66
Id. at 1383.
67
Id.
68
Id.
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your country and ours, your property and ours, and perhaps your life and
ours.69

In this regard, McKellar was in line with other critics who also pointed
out the hypocrisy of wealthy taxpayers who benefited from the war and
would benefit from tax reductions but opposed a soldiers’ bonus. This same
accusation was frequently thrown at Mellon. Representative Frear, for
example, commented that Mellon probably made more than $15,000–
$20,000 every day during the war:
Why, then, begrudge $1.25 a day bonus during service to the fellow who only
got $1 a day during the war to be shot at while living among the trenches,
mud, and vermin, or why oppose giving a dollar a day to the boy who
perchance lost his job when we seized him bodily and sent him to war?70

Mellon’s opposition, Frear claimed, was especially miserly since Mellon
would receive a 50% tax cut if his plan were passed.71 Critics such as
Senators Henry Ashurst (D-AZ) and Thaddeus Caraway (D-AR) also
pointed out the irony of the Saturday Evening Post publishing an article,
Cut Yourself a Piece of Cake, which, they claimed, basically said it was all
right for profiteers to keep their gains, but soldiers should not get anything
from the Treasury.72
Senator McKellar stressed du Pont’s self-interest in another way.
According to Senator McKellar, the purpose of the bonus was to “readjust”
soldiers’ pay to compensate them for the risks they took, not to show
gratitude to soldiers, as du Pont had asserted.73 Therefore, the soldiers’
bonus, Senator McKellar continued, was no different from the Dent Act,
which had compensated businesses after the war for terminated war
contracts. Du Pont’s two companies (and subsidiaries) received
$20,893,818 as readjustment compensation under the Dent Act. How,
Senator McKellar wondered, could du Pont, who received so much
compensation from the taxpayers, be against giving it to “the boys, by
whose risk and services you were enabled so largely to increase your
fortune, in exactly the same way that it treated you.”74
Others agreed with Senator McKellar. Representative Mell
Underwood (D-OH) said, “The Mellon bill would sandbag adjusted
compensation and untax the rich.”75 The same group of “war profiteers and
peace profiteers who made billions in profits” during the war and were
69

Id. at 1384.
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65 CONG. REC. 1384 (Jan. 24, 1924) (statement of Sen. McKellar).
74
Id.
75
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“overjoyed” when the railroads and war contractors received hundreds of
millions in adjusted compensation now wanted to reduce their surtaxes.76
They, whose “great fortunes were protected by our noble boys,” would
deny a small compensation to those “who bared their breasts to the bullets
of the enemy and slept in the vermin-infested trenches in France.”77
Some Republicans, like Senator George McLean (R-CT), agreed with
this view of the bonus’s purpose. The idea being touted by bonus critics
that patriotism would be commercialized by paying ex-soldiers an
additional $1 per day was not true, he said.78 In earlier times when sons of
the wealthy went into the army, it might have made sense to pay soldiers
little or nothing.79 This was no longer the case, however:
I see nothing but ingratitude and flagrant injustice in asking him to suffer the
tortures of war and in addition bear a financial loss out of all proportion to that
sustained by his shopmates who remained at home in peace and safety and had
their wages doubled.80

Bonus opponents responded to the charge that unlike Du Pont and other
companies, soldiers served out of patriotic duty and—unlike the defenserelated contracts of corporations—soldiers did not have a contract with the
government.81 Soldiers did not sign up to get a salary, nor did they contract
for indemnity against economic loss.82 Rather, opponents alleged, soldiers
joined out of a sense of patriotism that would be belittled should they get
additional compensation.83
In late January 1924, the Literary Digest conducted an expensive and
extensive pro-Mellon/anti-bonus campaign. At a cost of almost $300,000 it
sent out approximately 15 million letters, with attached surveys, which
made no “adequate” mention of competing tax reduction plans.84
Additionally, the Digest paid for full-page ads in various newspapers
asking readers to vote.85 Incensed critics claimed the letter was pure
propaganda:
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Sen. Swanson); 65 CONG. REC. 2535 (Feb. 16, 1924) (statement of Sen. Harris); id. at 2589 (statement
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[N]othing more nor less than an argument, very misleading and unfair, for the
Mellon plan, together with a warning or threat that you will get no reduction
in your income tax unless you send in at once your vote for this plan and let
your Senators and Congressmen know you favor it.86

The poll’s intention, critics continued, was to convince the public,
including laborers and others who would actually benefit more from the
other plans (not mentioned by the Digest), to support the Mellon plan as the
only way to tax reduction.87 The letter highlighted cuts for the common
man, but not for the wealthy. Not only did the letter leave the impression
that tax reduction had to be done the Mellon way or no way, but it also said
that there could be no tax reduction if there were a bonus. Consequently, as
Representative Thomas Lilly (D-WV) asserted, a vote for the Mellon Plan
in the Digest poll would be interpreted as a vote against a bonus.88
Critics were so worried about the campaign’s propaganda machine that
on January 21, Senator James Reed (D-MO) announced that the newly
formed Senate “Special Committee on Propaganda” would investigate the
“twin propaganda” that businesses and wealthy individuals were spreading
about the Mellon Plan and the soldiers’ bonus.89 The anti-bonus/pro-Mellon
Plan issues were coupled, he said, because the wealthy did not want to pay
their proportionally larger share of taxes needed to fund a bonus.90 In
February, Senator Claude Swanson (D-VA) requested that the Committee
pay particular attention to the Literary Digest letter and accompanying
poll.91 A few days later, Senator William Harris (D-GA) said he had
requested it.92 Unfortunately, one week later, the Committee indefinitely
postponed its activities (along with its tax investigation) because one of its
members had been hospitalized after being hit “by a stray bullet from a
battle between prohibition agents and bootleggers.”93 The Committee
apparently never resumed its activities.
The Citizens’ National Committee (sometimes called the Citizens’
National Committee in Support of the Mellon Tax Reduction Proposal),
formed in mid-January 1924 as a nonpartisan organization to support the
“scientific” Mellon Plan, did not initially seem to be the sort of
organization to worry critics. Chaired by the war hero Major General John
F. O’Ryan, its membership included economists and tax experts such as
E.R.A. Seligman and Frank Taussig, as well as other nationally prominent
figures such as Yale president James Angell, businessman Roger Babson,
86
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88
89
90
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former Harvard president Dr. C.W. Eliot, financier Otto Kahn, and
statesman Henry Stimson.94 Its biggest event was a “Tax Reduction Week”
in April which it actively promoted, as well as tax reduction generally.
Members spoke at lunches and on the radio; the Committee even planned
“flashes” on movie screens to “work up enthusiasm” for tax reduction on
behalf of the general public and to signal to Congress that the country
supported the Mellon Plan.95 College debates were arranged; large
advertisers mentioned Tax Reduction Week in their newspaper ads, and
“[h]undreds” of amateur wireless operators planned to “flash their tax
views over the country.”96 The Committee claimed that tax reduction week
resulted in a “barrage” of letters and telegrams to Congress, with 27,000
being mailed from Los Angeles alone.97
Despite the apparently golden reputations of Committee members,
some critics were concerned about the Committee’s relationship to the
bonus issue. One source of unease was the chair himself. O’Ryan became
chair just days after completing his work as counsel for a special Senate
Committee investigating inefficiency at the Veterans’ Bureau.98 In that
capacity, his function had been to help veterans. Now, Senator Joseph
Robinson (D-AR) and others alleged he was acting against their interests
and using information he had gained as special counsel to do so. O’Ryan,
they argued, was trying to influence people he had first organized in his
capacity as counsel into “a bureau of propaganda” to defeat adjusted
compensation legislation and enact the Mellon tax reduction plan.99
Although Robinson acknowledged that O’Ryan had not done anything
illegal, he stated that O’Ryan’s actions were neither “ethical” nor “fair.”100
O’Ryan, Robinson said, illustrated “a feeling widespread and growing that
ingratitude has sown itself in the hearts of the American people and that in
order to lighten the burden of taxation” they can disregard their duty to
those who fought in the war.101
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Others attacked the funding of the Citizens’ National Committee. In
March 1924, for example, Representative Lamar Jeffers charged that some
of the vast amount of money with which businesses—“Mellon interests”—
were funding the “two-ply” anti-bonus/pro-Mellon campaigns went to the
Committee.102 Claiming that one of the Committee’s purposes was to tie the
two issues together, he quoted from an affidavit by Edward L. Allen, a
founder and former executive director of the Anti-Bonus League.103 Allen,
who resigned from the League in late January in protest of its methods,
claimed that it had helped form the Citizens’ National Tax Reduction
Committee in order to kill the bonus bill.104 Moreover, he alleged that a
slush fund existed to both fight the bonus and to further the work of the
Committee. Allen also maintained that a Mr. Bronson Batchelor, the “man
and propagandist for the Anti-Bonus League,” had secured O’Ryan as the
Committee’s chair.105
For the rest of the spring, the pro-Mellon/anti-bonus campaigns
continued apace, with the Senate receiving both bills at approximately the
same time.106 Congress passed the bonus bill first, in May 1924.107 When
President Coolidge vetoed it, administration officials hinted that he might
have to veto the revenue bill, too, if Congress re-passed the bonus bill.108
Although Congress overrode his veto in order to enact the Adjusted
Compensation Act, President Coolidge did not veto the Revenue Act of
1924, which Congress passed in June.109 Neither law, however, gave
supporters all they desired. The vast majority of veterans received only a
certificate redeemable in 1945 rather than immediate cash, and the Revenue
Act of 1924 did not lower taxes enough to satisfy tax reduction
proponents.110 The battle for both continued.
II. 1930S NATIONAL ECONOMY LEAGUE ANTI-BONUS CAMPAIGN
The issue of soldiers’ bonuses heated up again in 1932. By that year,
bread riots and protests were occurring throughout the country, including
the deadly Ford Hunger March by unemployed workers at the River Rouge
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Michigan Ford plant in March 1932.111 Many World War I veterans were
also feeling the economic pinch of the Depression and wanted Congress to
immediately redeem the certificates they had received in 1924. In early
1932, a veteran named Walter Waters began organizing a veterans’ march
to Washington.112 By May, this “bonus expeditionary force” was on the
move and Congress was reconsidering the bonus issue.113
On May 4, at the same time that veterans were marching, the newly
formed National Economy Committee sent Congress and President Hoover
a petition demanding that the federal government cut approximately $450
million of the $1 billion it spent on veterans by eliminating payments to
veterans who had no war-related injuries and therefore were not “morally
entitled to such relief.”114 Although the Committee stressed that this was
not an attack on the bonus then being advocated, it also stated that they
opposed the bonus.115 Signed by numerous military veterans after a meeting
at the Harvard Club, the petition claimed that “the subservience of our
government authorities to the minority group receiving this subsidy”
severely impaired efforts to reduce the federal deficit, stabilize the dollar,
and restore a sense of confidence in the federal government.116 The noted
journalist Walter Lippmann called the petition “by all odds the most
impressive move yet made toward a real reduction in Federal
expenditure.”117 The Committee announced plans to attend both the
Democratic and Republican nominating conventions that summer to
persuade them to adopt a plank against benefits to veterans without warrelated injuries.118
July 1932 was a momentous time in the history of the bonus. At the
end of the month, the U.S. army, led by General Douglas MacArthur and
under orders from President Hoover, forcibly evicted the marchers from the
Washington campsite they had occupied over the summer.119 Meanwhile,
business groups such as the United States Chamber of Commerce launched
new campaigns to reduce government spending and taxation.120 At the same
time, the National Economy Committee announced the formation of a
111

DICKSON & ALLEN, supra note 7, at 52–53; 4 Die, Many Hurt in Jobless Clash at Ford Factory,
8, 1932, at 1.
See Bonus Army’s Commander Is a ‘Natural Born’ Leader, WASH. POST, June 9, 1932, at 3.
Row in Capital over Marchers, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, May 31, 1932, at 3.
Cut in Veterans’ Aid of $450,000,000 Asked to Abolish ‘Racket,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1932,

WASH. POST, Mar.
112
113
114

at 1.

115

Id.
Id.
117
Walter Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow: A Standard Is Raised, HARTFORD COURANT, May 6,
1932, at 26.
118
Plank Writers Invade Chicago, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, June 5, 1932, at A19.
119
E.g., J.F. Essary, Move to Block New Siege Seen as Hoover Aim, BALT. SUN, July 31, 1932,
at 2.
120
New Economy Drive by Commerce Body, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1932, at 5.
116

841

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

permanent national organization, the National Economy League.121 At its
first meeting, the League declared a broad purpose: to restore “the
American principle that government shall be ‘for the benefit of the whole
people.’”122 The League aimed to reduce “all wasteful and unnecessary
governmental expenditures, which have risen to the point where they
threaten the public credit and sap the resources of the people—and thus to
compel the reduction of the taxes which these rising expenditures
ultimately exact from all the people.”123
Major newspapers covered the League’s formation, including a long
front-page article in the New York Times. The coverage continued,
partially—as that article wrote—because of the timeliness of the issue, but
undoubtedly also because of the prominence of the League’s members.
President Hoover and then-New York Governor Franklin Roosevelt
endorsed its formation.124 Many notables had signed the Committee’s
original petition in May, including Archibald Roosevelt, son of former
President Theodore Roosevelt and a founder of the group; John W. Davis,
1924 Democratic presidential candidate and founder of the law firm Davis,
Polk, and Wardwell; and Colonel D.W. MacCormack, Commissioner of
Immigration.125 Successful businessmen, such as former RCA president
Major General James G. Harbord, were involved with the League, and
some—like Marshall Field and John D. Rockefeller—contributed $1000 or
more to the organization.126 Henry Curran, the League’s director from
1932–1936, had previously been director of the Association Against the
Prohibition Amendment, which was instrumental in achieving the repeal of
the Eighteenth Amendment in December 1933; he later served as deputy
mayor and chief magistrate of New York City.127 The League’s national
advisory board included more notables, such as Calvin Coolidge, Alfred E.
Smith, Elihu Root, Newton D. Baker, and General John Pershing.128
Organizers solicited other prominent individuals and launched major
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enrollment campaigns, including on college campuses such as Harvard.129
Within months, at least two other anti-bonus groups merged with the
League.130
The late July election of Rear Admiral Richard Byrd as chair of the
newly expanded National Economy League also helped assure continued
press coverage. He stated that he delayed his next polar expedition in order
to accept the position because he believed, as had Mellon in 1923, that
taxation was the biggest issue facing the nation.131 Whatever the causes of
the Depression, he said in his acceptance speech, it is “our inordinate
taxation more than anything else that keeps it chronic.”132 Every single
person bore this tax burden, he stated, because there were not enough rich
people to pay all the taxes needed.133 Everybody paid taxes, even wage
earners who did not pay income taxes but paid indirectly through higher
prices and lower wages.
The League’s first project was the elimination of wasteful spending on
veterans.134 This campaign illustrated conservatives’ interrelation of taxing,
spending, and form of government. In so doing, it echoed Mellon’s 1920s
arguments that from an economic standpoint, the country could not have
both tax reduction and soldiers’ bonuses.135 The League’s patriotic
arguments also mirrored those of the 1920s. In a September Leaguesponsored radio address, Major General O’Ryan, the Citizens National
Committee chair in the mid-20s, not only argued that payment of an
immediate cash bonus was unfair to people already heavily burdened with
taxes, but he also used the same moral and patriotic appeals against the
bonus used in the 1920s.136 The bonus was unjustified because it changed
the concept of patriotism. Yes, he said, the bonus caused financial
instability, but “[a]bove all, let it be made clear that honorable service in
war at the call of country is more precious than gold . . . [and] should not
be sullied. It should not be bartered.”137
In November 1932, following the presidential election, National
Economy League Chair Byrd said “[u]nfair” taxation confiscated property,
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and taxes at all levels of government must be cut.138 As in July, Byrd noted
the heavy burden of paying for government fell on the common man, who
was often unaware that he was paying these taxes because they were
hidden in the price of goods and services they bought (such as bread or
electricity).139 He reiterated this again in a December radio speech in which
he stated that every person who heard or read his speech paid “at least three
months of labor” per year in hidden taxes that could tax people to
“destruction.”140 Conservatives would stress this theme of hidden taxes later
in the 1930s, especially in the 1936 election campaign, when hidden taxes
were a major issue in the Republican effort to defeat Roosevelt.141
Other League supporters argued that a cash bonus and other
extravagant veterans’ benefits were not only wasteful but harmed American
democracy because of the process that created them. These programs, the
League argued, were the result of an organized minority that pressured
Congress through strategic lobbying to enact legislation that only benefited
special interests. Thus, the League “unequivocally” opposed an immediate
cash bonus for veterans not just because it placed “an intolerable financial
burden” on the country, or because it was a demand “without fair basis or
merit,” but because its passage would be caving in “to the dictation of an
organized minority.”142 “All our American principles are opposed to it.
There is no moral justification for it.”143 These “laws for the special few”
cost $15 billion, which must be paid for by everyone: “For the first time
since 1776 there is need for a second declaration of independence to break
the servitude to organized minorities of the great majority of our people.”144
Ironically, the only way to fight this was for “the great majority also to
organize, for masses of people cannot act in unison without organizing.”145
Special interest lobbying, of which Byrd and other League supporters
spoke, was an important issue of the day. Both academics and politicians
were worried about it. Congress had already investigated the issue several
times, including the 1929 Senate Judiciary Lobby Investigation chaired by
Caraway, who in the mid-1920s had spoken out about the Mellon/bonus
lobbying.146 President Hoover’s letter supporting the League on its
formation had also expressed concern about lobbying. The country, he
wrote, needed a national nonpartisan organization like the League to help
138
139
140

Byrd Says Tax Load Is Enslaving Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1932, at 20.
Id.; see supra note 133.
Byrd Welcomed Home by 500 at Economy League Reception, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1932,

at 4.

141

Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Remembering the ‘Forgotten Man’ (and Woman): Hidden Taxes and
the 1936 Election, in 4 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 327, 327–40 (John Tiley ed., 2010).
142
Fights Surrender to Bonus ‘Minority,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1932, at 2.
143
Id.
144
Bonus Payment Plan Denounced by Byrd, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 4, 1932, at 2.
145
Id.
146
See S. REP. NO. 71-43, at 1–3 (1929).

844

108:825 (2014)

Conservative Tax Policy

Congress “defend” against the constant pressure of lobbyists to increase
governmental spending and trim expenditures.147
The League’s view that an organized minority was lobbying Congress
to support the bonus had some truth to it, but as the well-organized, probonus American Legion and others quickly pointed out, the National
Economy League was also an organized minority engaged in lobbying. In
fact, at a joint House and Senate hearing on veteran affairs during
December 1932–January 1933, League critics claimed the League violated
the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which required political organizations to
submit their contributions and expenses to the Clerk of the House of
Representatives.148 The Act, Representative Wright Patman (D-TX) said,
defined a “political” committee as one that accepts contributions and/or
makes expenditures “for the purpose of influencing or attempting to
influence the election of a candidate” for Congress or President.149 Yet,
Patman continued, the League filed no reports even though it was spending
large amounts of money to do just that.150 He quoted statements made by
the League prior to the November 1932 election, such as one by the League
organizer Archibald Roosevelt: “When any Congressman votes against
something of sound economy, we expect to have the local chief of the
National Economy League in his district know about it and raise hell if he
can.”151
Representative Patman then elaborated on the political aspect of the
League. For example, the League was organized according to congressional
districts and members were asked to state the congressional district in
which they lived.152 Although some Representatives agreed that the League
violated the Act, others, such as Representative Joseph Hooper (R-MI),
said the League should not be singled out; other organizations should also
be investigated for violations.153
League Director Henry Curran admitted that the League had not filed
any report but claimed that such failure did not violate the Corrupt
Practices Act because the League did not lobby.154 Its purpose, he said, was
to be “a bureau of information” to provide facts and arguments to the
American people; it was the people themselves, using those facts, who will
147
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act to influence legislation in Congress, not the League.155 Newspapers did
not file reports even though they distributed facts and arguments, he noted,
and neither should the League.156
At the hearing, League critics made two other charges—both of which
had been made against bonus supporters in the 1920s. First, they claimed
that many of the League’s leading members were “inconsistent.”157
Members such as Byrd, General Pershing, and Major General James
Harbord wanted to eliminate pensions for injured veterans even though
they themselves were receiving large retirement pensions from the federal
government.158 Other members, critics noted, received different government
subsidies. Representative Patman observed, for example, that League
founder Archibald Roosevelt’s company provided ocean mail steamship
service for the post office.159
Harbord resigned in early 1933, shortly after these charges appeared,
and later stated that he thought the purpose of the League was to
recommend cuts in all branches of government and its focus on veterans’
benefits had become “very embarrassing to me as a retired Army
officer.”160 In April, Byrd resigned as League chair, but he remained on the
executive committee.161 His stated reason for resigning was his need to
attend to his personal affairs;162 one wonders, however, whether all the
negative publicity about his receipts from the government while he urged
the elimination of some veterans’ benefits played a role in his decision.
The second charge made at the joint hearings was that the League
represented, and was funded primarily by, businesses and wealthy
taxpayers in order to lessen their own tax burdens. This was a longstanding accusation. Indeed, days after the League’s formation,
Representative William Connery Jr. (D-MA) had called the League the
“new-born favorite child of big business” and of large income taxpayers
who see “no percentage of profit in [the bonus] for the Wall Street
interests.”163 The fact that many large, pro-business newspapers endorsed
the League lent some weight to this allegation.164
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164
National Economy League Purposes Heartily Endorsed by World-Telegram, HARTFORD
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Representative Patman also had charged that the Mellon and Morgan
“group” had helped fund the League.165 At the January hearings, Curran
provided information that supported these charges. The list of contributors
he provided showed that by the end of 1932, about six months after its
founding, the League had received approximately $200,000 in
contributions from 25,000 individuals, with an average contribution of
$8.166 Seventeen individuals, however, had given $1000 or more, with the
sum total of those contributions ($35,100) comprising slightly more than
17% of the total.167 The list of names included wealthy industrialists,
bankers (including names of Morgan-connected individuals), and others
whose names are still recognizable today, such as Marshall Field and John
D. Rockefeller, Jr.168
Wealthy individuals and groups certainly contributed to the League. In
fact, the League had greater support in states that paid the most in income
taxes, such as Massachusetts.169 Moreover, as Representative Charles
Gifford (R-MA) pointed out, there was an inverse relationship between the
(implicitly shiftless) tax-eating individuals on benefits and taxpayers: there
were fewer veterans on government benefits in these higher paying states
than in states like Mississippi that contributed little to federal revenues.170
Some League critics charged that the League’s real purpose was not
government economy but reducing taxes on “large income taxpayers.”171
These critics noted that if the federal government stopped paying veterans’
benefits, state and local governments would be the sole providers of the
benefits.172 Since these governments were funded primarily by property
taxes, the tax burden would shift to already overburdened average citizens.
In contrast, using federal funds to pay veterans’ benefits comported with
the ability-to-pay doctrine, because these funds were derived largely from
income and estate taxes paid by the wealthy.
In March 1933, Congress passed the Economy Act of 1933, which
among other things, reduced payments to veterans.173 Accordingly, on
April 1, 1933, President Roosevelt signed an executive order that cut
approximately $400 million per year from the federal budget partially by
eliminating disability pensions to veterans whose injuries were not war
165
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related.174 Veterans responded with a second, smaller bonus march on
Washington. Roosevelt avoided Hoover’s forced eviction and attempted to
deflect the marchers by offering them jobs in the Citizens’ Conservation
Corps (CCC).175
This offer did not entirely placate veterans, and the battle over
veterans’ benefits persisted. The League, still in its anti-bonus leadership
position, continued opposing the benefits not just on economic grounds but
also because benefits to able-bodied veterans were “in clear defiance of
principle and self-respect.”176 Bonus proponents once again continued to
highlight the hypocrisy of the League’s attack because, as Representative
Patman charged, some League members “have received more from the
Federal government than any disabled veteran. These favors, through the
Federal Reserve printing of their bank notes at ridiculously low prices,
income tax refunds and war contract settlements made the money given to
veterans seem absurdly small.”177
While bonus proponents continued to allege that the League and other
bonus opponents engaged in unfair lobbying by using “the daily press, the
radio and the screen and stage to disseminate their subversive
propaganda,”178 the League argued that bonus proponents unfairly pressed
their views. In April 1934, for example, League Director Henry Curran sent
Senators a letter asserting that the veterans lobby threatened to defeat the
reelection of any Senator opposing the then-current House bill for an
immediate cash payment—the exact opposite of the political threats bonus
supporters claimed bonus opponents made.179 In actuality, lobbying about
the bonus was so heated on both sides that there were (unsuccessful) calls
for an investigation of all veterans’ organizations in 1934.180 In 1936, there
were also calls for the ongoing Senate Lobbying Investigation Committee
to investigate the League,181 but it never did.
The bonus bill battle continued throughout 1934 and 1935. After
debating various bills during the spring of 1935, Congress finally passed
one in May, but President Roosevelt vetoed it for reasons familiar to
174
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conservatives.182 From an economic standpoint, he stated, the boost in
spending power veterans received would not have lasting effects for
recovery.183 This was especially true because the bill’s inflationary
effects—since it provided for no new taxes to fund the payment—would
more than cancel out any positive effects. Even without such results,
Roosevelt claimed he opposed the bill because it went against American
principles of not allowing “political coercion by minorities.”184 Not
surprisingly, the League praised Roosevelt, claiming the veto was “good
insurance against bad inflation.”185
Part of Roosevelt’s opposition to the bonus undoubtedly stemmed
from his own, different, political priorities. He wanted tax revenues to fund
programs designed to aid economic recovery and cushion the effects of the
Depression. His recommendations to Congress the next month for higher
taxes on large incomes and inheritances demonstrated his willingness to
enact, at least symbolically, “soak-the-rich” legislation to do so—or so his
critics charged.186
In January 1936, Congress passed yet another bonus bill which
Roosevelt vetoed yet again for the same reasons.187 However, greater tax
issues may have played a role in his decision to veto the bill a second time:
just weeks earlier, the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler had
punched a multi-million dollar hole in federal revenues by invalidating the
processing tax in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.188 Within days
(hours in the House), Congress overrode the veto and replaced the 1924
bonus certificates with interest-bearing Treasury bonds that could be
redeemed as early as June 15, 1936189—accelerating the veterans’ bonus by
almost a decade. Once the bonus issue was resolved, the League continued
its push for thriftiness in government, but press coverage declined, and by
1943, the League basically disappeared from the public eye.
Conservatives generally, however, continued to link the broader issues
of taxing, spending, and the nature of American democracy. Indeed, some
prominent League participants were active in other conservative grassroots
182
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organizations, such as the American Liberty League. These groups also
draped their arguments in the American flag and used modern media and
marketing techniques in their attempts to sway legislators and the public to
defeat Roosevelt and his tax-and-spend “socialist” agenda.190
III. THEN AND NOW
Conservative tax policy still rests on the same three arguments that
conservative pro-tax reduction/anti-bonus campaigns used in the 1920s and
1930s. The first argument is an economic one designed to appeal to the
“common” (i.e., middle class) voter. It asserts that reducing taxes on the
wealthy benefits everyone in two ways. Lower taxes are economically
efficient because they increase investments, the benefits of which “trickle
down” to the masses by expanding jobs, increasing wages, and lowering
prices.191 Lower taxation, they also state, is economically efficient because
it curbs wasteful government spending, which also depresses economic
growth.192
Conservatives also continue to articulate, as the National Economy
League did so succinctly in its 1934 letter to Congress, the connection
between taxing and spending: “Will you take this [money for the bonus]
out of us in taxes all at once or try to borrow it from somebody else, or run
it off the printing presses in inflated money?”193 Although conservatives do
a public service today by continuing to highlight the connection between
taxing and spending, their economic rationales and conclusions are
inextricably intertwined with political ideology. Not only do recent
statistics on increased wealth and income disparity show the limits of
“trickle-down” theory,194 but also all government spending is not wasteful.
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Many believe that properly devised spending on infrastructure, especially
early childhood education for example, can stimulate economic growth.195
Conservatives often display curious blind spots about government
spending. For instance, their examples of excessive spending usually focus
on “entitlement” benefits for large masses of people—veterans’ benefits,
social security, and healthcare.196 Conservatives often tend to ignore,
however, the large amount of government spending that benefits the
wealthy. This spending can be through the tax system by means of tax
preferences (or loopholes, depending on one’s viewpoint) for wealthy
individuals and corporations. The spending also can be via direct
expenditures. Recently, conservatives in Congress voted to cut back food
stamps while at the same time continue agricultural subsidies that go
largely to the wealthy.197 Direct spending that benefits the wealthy also
frequently occurs in the context of defense (a part of the budget
conservatives generally do not want to cut). Although President
Eisenhower warned against the wealth and power accruing to the “militaryindustrial complex” in his 1961 farewell address,198 bonus supporters in the
1920s and 1930s had already noted these dangers and commented on the
sizeable military pensions and defense contracts wealthy anti-bonus
individuals and corporations received. Today, the country’s current huge
national defense budget, increasing tax expenditures, and privatization of
many functions continue—if not enlarge—the concentration of such
material benefits and power. A recent report found that not only is the
federal government spending more on service contractors than on federal
employees, but that the cost of those contractors on average is almost twice
that it would be if federal employees performed the services.199
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The second conservative argument, then and now, is a legal and
constitutional one: heavy taxing and spending destroy fundamental aspects
of American democracy. High taxes support an enlarged government
whose programs sometimes violate Tenth Amendment limitations on the
federal government. Moreover, the high taxation needed to fund such
spending restricts individual freedom and may even be considered an
illegal confiscation of property, as Byrd alleged in 1932.200 President
Reagan, for example, when proposing his tax reduction plan in 1985, said:
I believe that in both spirit and substance our tax system has come to be unAmerican. . . . The first American Revolution was sparked by an unshakable
conviction: Taxation without representation is tyranny. Two centuries later a
second American Revolution for hope and opportunity is gathering force
again, a peaceful revolution but born of popular resentment against a tax
system that is unwise, unwanted and unfair.201

Others have gone even further. Herman Cain, campaigning for the
Republican 2012 presidential nomination, for example, called the tax code
a “21st-century version of slavery.”202 Conservatives also argue that income
taxes, especially if progressive, can easily become a tyranny of the majority
in which the low (or no) tax majority shift the burden of taxation to a
minority—the rich.203
The conservative constitutional argument, coupled with a moral
component in its economic argument, easily—and consistently—merges
into a patriotic argument. Moral appeals contrast the growth-creating
entrepreneur (the taxpayer) with the lazy, benefit-seeking tax eater who
saps economic vitality from the nation by relying on the government for
food, housing, and medical care. This morally inferior tax taker also
undermines the American character and ultimately the American way of
life. The tax eater lacks independence, self-reliance, and the entrepreneurial
spirit. These traits are not only the ones by which Americans define
themselves, but the ones that stereotypically lie at the heart of American
progress and exceptionalism. Mitt Romney’s (in)famous comment during
the 2012 presidential campaign characterizing the 47% of Americans who
pay no taxes as freeloaders who were “dependent upon government”
exemplifies this.204 Although his comments were meant to be private, they
200
201

Byrd Says Tax Load Is Enslaving Nation, supra note 138.
Transcript of President’s Speech on Revising the Tax System, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1985,
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echo modern public rhetoric about dependent welfare queens. They also
echo earlier claims that a bonus to able-bodied veterans was not only
wasteful spending but also went against American traits of self-respect and
independence.205
Despite the existence of alternative notions of economics, patriotism,
and democracy, conservatives have successfully wedded their conceptions,
especially of patriotism, to low taxation. Perhaps the most prominent
example of this is their appropriation of the American Revolution, as
illustrated by President Reagan’s comments in 1985. Back in the 1930s,
Admiral Byrd of the National Economy League stated that “citizens must
develop the same spirit our forefathers had in the days of the Boston tea
party” to save the country from the “crushing” burden of taxation.206 In
modern times, actual reenactments of the Boston Tea Party and the
formation of a political movement called the Tea Party have used its potent
symbolism to link low or no taxation to the essence of American
democracy. In short, whether “mainstream” Republicans or “tea partiers,”
conservatives have by and large “captured” patriotism and use it to promote
their tax positions.207
Conservatives have accomplished this feat through adroitly using
rhetoric and media to influence the public. Politicians, of course, have
always used these tools to sell their agenda to the masses. However, the
origins of the methods and means used today reached their first fruition
during the period of the anti-bonus/pro-reduction campaigns. It was then
that professionals expanded new knowledge about persuasion gained
through government efforts to encourage support for World War I. Post
war, research continued to rapidly expand in fields such as psychology,
statistics, and marketing; professionals quickly used the newly gained
knowledge in the political sphere to sell candidates and policies, just as
they applied them to sell toothpaste in the commercial sphere.208 In that
about tax increases only for the rich. See, e.g., MOLLY MICHELMORE, TAX AND SPEND: THE WELFARE
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same period, technology created and expanded new mass media—most
notably the radio, which gave professionals and politicians easy access to
millions of people.
Both liberals and conservatives, of course, used this knowledge and
technology. President Roosevelt’s popular fireside chats may be the best
example of Democratic usage during this period. Republicans, however,
generally caught on more quickly. For example, the 1920 Republican
presidential campaign, under the guidance of advertising pioneer Albert D.
Lasker, was the first modern media-driven sell-the-candidate campaign.209
In 1928, when the radio came of political age, the Republicans dedicated a
significant amount of their funds to the radio, as well as using film in their
campaigns.210 In 1936, the Republicans turned the entire campaign over to
the professionals—publicity agents, journalists, and advertising experts—to
use modern advertising techniques, propaganda, and the media in an
attempt to “sell” Alf Landon, just as they would sell any product.211
Conservative groups in this period also used the same modern methods to
oppose Roosevelt and the New Deal.212
The 21st century is a similar period of rapid growth in new methods of
mass communication and in new knowledge about human behavior (e.g.,
behavioral economics, behavioral psychology, and cognitive theory
generally). Both conservatives and liberals have made effective use of this
knowledge and media. Conservatives even complain about the liberal
media bias. Nevertheless, as the success of Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, and
the Tea Party movement indicate, conservatives have been remarkably
adept at putting modern psychology and technology at their service.213
In 1924 the Citizens’ National Committee’s tax campaign, probably
the first modern tax lobbying campaign,214 used techniques still employed
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209
See JOHN A. MORELLO, SELLING THE PRESIDENT, 1920: ALBERT D. LASKER, ADVERTISING,
AND THE ELECTION OF WARREN G. HARDING 2 (2001).
210
See LIETTE GIDLOW, THE BIG VOTE: GENDER, CONSUMER CULTURE, AND THE POLITICS OF
EXCLUSION, 1890S–1920S, at 179–80 (2007); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE
PRESIDENCY: A HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING 20 (3d ed. 1996);
R.L. Duffus, Our Radio Battle for the Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1928, at 139.
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today. Then, for example, there was Tax Reduction Week; now, there is
“Tax Freedom Day,” theoretically the day in the year a person has worked
long enough to pay all his or her taxes.215 Ninety years ago the radio and the
movies were the media the modern media politicians and political groups
used to convey their messages; today it is the Internet, especially social
networks such as Twitter and Facebook. Organizations using civic-minded
names compile and disseminate information as objective facts. In reality,
however, the groups’ neutral sounding names often mask an ideological
bias that goes undetected. Back then the organizations had names like the
Citizens’ National Committee and the National Economy League. Today
organizations use names such as Americans for Tax Reform.216 They
widely disseminate their views, often disguised as news and “facts.” They
even created “news” through “Tax Reduction Weeks” in the 1920s and tea
party reenactments in the modern era.
Whether these groups’ pronouncements are facts or propaganda, of
course, depends on the definition of propaganda. Identifying propaganda,
however, is a difficult enterprise. Like pornography, its definition
frequently depends on the perspective of the recipient. Nevertheless, it is
harder to differentiate propaganda from objective fact (leaving aside the
philosophical question of whether objective facts exist) when the recipient
does not know the source of the information. This phenomenon underlies
much of the current uneasiness about anonymous donors and
advertisements in the political context. This concern also existed in the
decades between the world wars. An “organized propagandist,”
Representative John Jones (D-TX) said in 1924, is worse than a “crackbrained agitator[]” because the latter operates openly.217 Consequently,
“[v]ery few are convinced by them. But the propagandist sometimes
operates through a mask of deception.”218
Patriotism is a frequent handmaiden of propaganda because it evokes
emotional responses that often unconsciously influence our perceptions and
interpretations of information and actions. Psychologists, sociologists, and
economists explain why this is so, using concepts such as framing,
cognitive biases, schemas, and worldviews, all of which explain how
people perceive, filter, and organize the huge amount of data they
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encounter daily.219 Modern research in behavioral economics and
psychology has enhanced experts’ understanding of these concepts, which
lawyers, politicians, marketers, and others have utilized.220 Neither the
knowledge nor its applications is entirely new, however. While critiquing
Mellon Plan supporters, for example, Representative Jones noted the
deleterious effect of those emotional appeals: “Facts are prosaic things, and
what are facts when the circus is on . . . . Reason simply stacks arms and
leaves the field under those circumstances.”221
Mellon Plan supporters similarly criticized their opponents. In April
1924, for example, Major General O’Ryan, bonus opponent and chair of
the Citizens’ National Committee in Support of the Mellon Tax Reduction
Proposal, spoke of the need for tax and spending cuts.222 Politicians, he
said, “befog and befuddle” issues with “clap-trap” phrases to which the
public is “susceptible” because such appeals were easier to listen to and
less “tiresome” than “to examine critically into a matter that concerns them
only as it concerns the public generally.”223 The Mellon Plan, he and other
supporters asserted, was scientific, not claptrap.224
Whether their plan was claptrap was and is debatable, of course. What
is not debatable is that, despite their assertions to the contrary, conservative
anti-bonus/Mellon Plan supporters used claptrap, just as their opponents
did. Then—as now—patriotism is conservatives’ claptrap, their circus that
causes reason to leave the field. It is also the portion of the conservative tax
argument that has the greatest mass appeal.
Because they are based in emotion, patriotic appeals are susceptible to
cognitive biases.225 In America, the linkage of low taxation with patriotism
provides particularly rich ground for emotive, often subconscious,
reactions. After all, schoolchildren learn that the country itself sprang from
219
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a tax protest and national icons like President Reagan constantly remind us
that heavy taxation is a constraint upon freedom.226
It is not surprising, then, that conservatism’s linkage of low taxation to
patriotism has been so successful. It has not been a complete victory; after
all, the income tax still exists despite decades of conservative attempts to
abolish it.227 The conservative patriotic tax appeal has succeeded, however,
to the extent that Americans currently pay (despite recent increases)
relatively low income taxes historically and lower rates compared to some
countries.228 Indeed, many Americans pay no income taxes (though they
probably pay social security taxes).229
CONCLUSION
The linkage of tax reduction to the soldiers’ bonus in the 1920s and
1930s described in this Article illustrates conservatives’ long standing
tripartite stand on tax policy. Although both liberals and conservatives bear
responsibility for the chaotic state of tax and tax policy today, this Article
asserts that conservatives bear more responsibility because they have
conveyed their policy more successfully. This, the Article alleges, has
occurred primarily because they have linked their conception of patriotism
to low taxation. Unfortunately, this linkage limits the realm of politically
possible solutions to many of today’s most pressing issues, including
taxation. This is not just because it enables emotion to trump rationality,
but also because the conservative vision of patriotism is incomplete.
American democracy is not founded solely on the principle of liberty, but
also on the principle of equality. Liberty itself has a positive side, not just a
negative one. Conservatives emphasize the negative, “freedom from” side
in their exaltation of individualism, small government, and low taxation.
226
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The Preamble to the Constitution, however, also provides for the promotion
of the general welfare—which involves positive liberty. Positive liberty
means that the government has a duty not just to protect negative liberty
but also to assist positive liberty. Positive liberty encompasses people’s
basic human rights to such things as food, health, and education—which
are, in fact, preconditions to negative liberty.230
The patriotism–tax linkage also hinders debate about general issues
such as healthcare because it obscures real understanding of—and debate
about—conservatives’ two substantive points: the necessary connection
between taxing and spending and the desirable size of government. It
encourages fuzzy thinking that allows people to claim they want lower
taxes, less government spending, and smaller government while at the same
time insist government programs (such as Medicare or Social Security)
remain uncut, and even demand more from the government (whether it is
more gun control, immigration control, or food-and-drug inspections). In
this era of huge deficits and incoherent tax policy, these two substantive
aspects of conservatives’ tax position are the very ones that need critical
attention. Separating them from the emotion of patriotism would help
create an atmosphere more conducive to the thoughtful tax discussion the
country requires. Dropping their strong patriotic appeals and focusing on
substance would be the most patriotic action conservatives could take.
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